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Abstract: Digitalization has increased the significance of cybersecurity within the current highly interconnected society. The 
number and complexity of different cyber-attacks as well as other malicious activities has increased during the last decade 
and affected the efforts needed to maintain a sufficient level of cyber resilience in organisations. Due to Industry 4.0 and the 
advanced use of IT and OT technologies and the adaptation of IoT devices, sensors, AI technology, etc., cybersecurity can no 
longer considered to be taken lightly when trying to gain a competitive advantage in business. When transferring from 
traditional reactive cybersecurity measures to proactive cyber resilience, cyber ranges are considered a particularly useful 
tool for keeping the organisation in the game. With their background in defence research (e.g., DARPA NCP in 2008), cyber 
ranges are defined as interactive simulated platforms representing networks, systems, tools, and/or applications in a safe, 
legal environment that can be used for developing cyber skills or testing products and services. Cyber ranges can be 
considered vital in facilitating and fostering cybersecurity training, certification, and general education. Despite the 
definition, cyber ranges seem to be only used by military or so-called “technical people” when quite a few more organisations 
could benefit from them. This article attempts to reveal the secrets behind cyber ranges and their use focusing on suitable 
target environments, common functions, and use cases. Our main objective is to identify a classification of cyber ranges and 
skills related to these diverse types of ranges. We emphasise the cyber resilience of any type of organisation that demands 
the use of cyber range type of training. Different training scenarios improve different sets of organisational skills. The article 
is based on an extensive survey on cyber ranges, their use, and technical capabilities that was conducted in CyberSec4Europe 
project. 
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1. Introduction 
Given the concept of a cyber crisis (or even cyber war), one has to imagine a cyber weapon being used in a cyber-
attack, for example of a malware program or a denial-of-service attack. This attack is usually directed towards a 
victim (organization or person) that is facing a crisis situation. Different countries have different laws protecting 
the victim against this kind of aggression. Outside the realm of cyber security, there are usually various kinds of 
laws prohibiting and restricting the usage of physical weapons, even to the point of having specialized physical 
shooting ranges abiding the law (Ministry of Interior, Finland, 1998/2003) for the practice of regular weaponry. 
In the cyber context, these kinds of cyber weapon shooting ranges are being formed as cyber arenas or cyber 
ranges; however, the development of regulations on how these platforms should be used is currently lacking. 
 
Cyber ranges (or cyber arenas) are technical platforms that facilitate education, training, and exercise of cyber 
security (Karjalainen and Kokkonen, 2020a). According to Russo, Costa and Armado (2020), these ranges are 
complex infrastructures that simulate real-world cybersecurity scenarios. These technical platforms have 
developed in different organizations simultaneously from smaller technical laboratory environments to cloud-
based solutions. They might have originally been platforms used to demonstrate products and technology, or 
even mirroring a technical production network to act as an introductory platform for new employees. Ukwandu 
et al (2020) have identified current trends, types, target domains and technologies used in cyber ranges and 
testbeds. On the other hand, the definition of cyber ranges does not limit or restrict use cases, target groups, or 
participant roles utilizing a cyber range (ECSO, 2020). 
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2. At whom cyber ranges are targeted? 
Cyber ranges can be used for training or educating individuals or groups of people such as employees of 
companies or organisations. They can be used for cyber security research and development, hosting various 
kinds of events, certifying products or services, performing competence assessment, or recruiting people (ECSO, 
2020; Yamin, Katt, and Gkioulos, 2020). Some cyber ranges can be used to train cyber defence (NATO CCDCOE, 
2020; Vykopal at al, 2017). Events in a cyber range can be cyber security exercises or competitions targeted at a 
company (FINGRID, 2017), an organisation (Valtori, 2020; MITRE, 2014), international (NATO CCDCOE, 2020), or 
national cyber security exercises (Secretariat of the Security Committee, 2019). An exercise can target a specific 
audience without any shared training or background (CyberSec4Europe, 2021). Also, various cyber security 
related competitions such as Capture the Flag (CTF) competitions targeted at individuals or teams can be 
organised as a cyber range event. Firstly, the following sections introduce target groups benefiting from cyber 
ranges and secondly, use cases that the cyber ranges have supported. 
2.1 Target groups  
Individuals, Personal Knowledge, Skills and Abilities (KSA)  
 
Cyber ranges offer a technical environment where citizens can train their understanding of the cybersecurity 
phenomena. The European Union has produced the European Qualifications Framework (EQF), which helps to 
improve transparency, comparability, and portability of people's qualifications between the nations in the EU. 
These qualifications are listed as learning outcomes Knowledge, Skills and Abilities (KSAs). Cyber ranges could 
be used in a Cyber Security Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) implementation (Fischer-Hübner et al., 2020), 




These KSAs are developed through degree programmes following a curriculum suited for the respected EQF 
level. Curriculum students of higher education (Karjalainen, Kokkonen and Puuska 2019; Saharinen et al, 2019; 
Karjalainen and Kokkonen, 2020b) are sometimes required to pass courses that utilize these cyber ranges. 
Regardless these courses being either a mandatory or elective part of their studies, many education and research 
organizations are developing the capability (Frank et al, 2017) to host courses through these environments as 




Companies invest in protecting their environments, as digitalization is forcing them to be increasingly available 
online both in the private and public sectors. To uphold these availability requirements, companies need to 
employ a capable workforce provided by the education sector (Bell and Oudshoorn, 2018). Students with 
practical knowledge of handling a live cyber crisis are often valued, and the capability of upholding the cyber 




Additionally, individuals face the problem of a cyber crisis when e.g., their digital identity is stolen, or payment 
frauds are committed in the e-banking realm (Singh and Rastogi, 2018). In both companies and individual cases, 
these cyber crises end up in police cybercrime statistics. Cybercrimes are investigated by specialized police units 
that survey and handle cybercrimes for prosecution. Exact methods of cybercrime investigation are still a 





If the cyber crisis that either faces companies or individuals exceeds a certain threshold, a nation has to 
implement its laws and regulations to enter a state of war (Sevis and Seker, 2016). This means, depending on 
the country in question, that the military can start protecting its civilians and assets, be they physical or cyber. 
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After these laws or regulations are invoked, the protection of assets is commonly left to the nation’s military 
forces.  
 
Military cyber defence capabilities  
 
The Defence Forces of different countries have been mentioned to use National Cyber Ranges: Norway (NTNU, 
2018), Estonia (Republic of Estonia Centre of Defence Investment, 2020) and Finland (JYVSECTEC, 2017; 
EU2019.fi, 2019) to name a few. Additionally, multinational coalitions have practiced in self-contained cyber 
ranges brought about for the need, for example, Locked Shields (NATO CCDCOE, 2020). Different military forces 




All the aforementioned entities have Cyber Security researchers (ENISA, 2020a; 2020b; 2020c) working 
separately and in coalition on different research projects. The development of cyber ranges as such is a less 
researched area, as the phenomena and results after working in the cyber range are typically more sought after.  
2.2 Use cases for cyber ranges 
Security research, testing, development, and certification: Development testbeds, research environments, and 
certification tracks have been used in the industry for longer than the term Cyber Range has existed. 
Development testbeds are usually set up by development teams to see how their updates work in an 
environment mimicking the production environment. Research environments aim at closeness to the real thing, 
or a phenomenon is researched by scientists, often relying on ICT environments separated from the Internet. 
Certification bodies require that the test samples pass through a set of phases on a track in order to gain a label 
of quality provided by the entity awarding the certificates. 
 
Security Education through Competence Building and Assessment: Competence building follows the said 
certification bodies to offer practicing environments, i.e. cyber ranges, for students trying to reach validation for 
their skills. This thought has brought up the environment itself to be an active area for student assessment how 
their competence has developed while working within the environment.  
 
Development of Cyber Capabilities and Resilience: The earlier mentioned competence building is a part of an 
individual’s growth as an expert. The development of cyber capabilities and resilience looks at the phenomenon, 
outcomes using a cyber range, from the organisation´s viewpoint, e.g. Fingrid, 2017. One part of it is recruitment, 
where organizations look for competent workforce, and the interview process might have recruitment sections 
handled in a technical cyber environment. Additionally, ongoing personnel might be trained using organizational 
exercises. 
 
Cross-domain development environment (Digital Dexterity): The digital dexterity of the whole domain is 
developed when multiple organisations from multiple industries participate in a cyber range dedicated to the 
particular industries. These exercises usually show the weak points of processes in multiple organizations, e.g., 
supply chain processes.  
 
National and International Cybersecurity Competitions or Exercises: National or international cybersecurity 
competitions, in which individuals, organizations or nations compete against one another as well as national and 
international cyber security exercises, may both advance all the aforementioned use cases. 
3. Cyber range usage based on a survey 
In this section, we analyse the data from a conducted cyber range survey. The survey was conducted in the   
CyberSec4Europe project, and it was open from 23 April 2020 to 27 May 2020. A total of 44 responses were 
received, of which 39 responses were considered valid. The number of survey responses, 39, is considered valid 
based on the survey authors’ experience in the subject. In the survey terms, we decided not to publish any cyber 
range specific features and capabilities. The survey consisted of single-choice, multiple-choice and open 
questions, and it did not contain any mandatory fields. (CyberSec4Europe, 2020)  
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3.1 Cyber range target groups 
The survey data had a total of seven target groups (TGs) listed, and respondents provided three additional target 
groups. Hence, the data comprised a total of ten target groups: General public, Secondary level students, Degree 
program students (Bachelor’s or Master's degree students), Government organizations, Companies and 
Enterprises, Non-profit associations or similar, Other, and respondent reported Training Service Providers, 
Systems Integrators, and Cyber Professionals. The respondents belonged to the following target groups: Training 
Service Providers, Systems Integrators and Cyber Professionals. They are presented in the columns of Figure 1. 
The most represented target groups were Companies and Enterprises 77% (30), Degree program students 
(Bachelor or Master's degree students) 59% (23), Government organizations 59% (23), Non-profit associations 
or similar 23% (9), General Public 18% (7) and Secondary level students 18% (7). The following groups were 
represented in the data by just one respondent: Training Service Providers, Systems Integrators, Cyber 
Professionals and Other. The top 20% of the cyber ranges supported four or more target groups. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of target groups (N=39) 
The number of target groups supported by cyber ranges is shown in Figure 2. Single Target Group was reported 
by 23% (9), two target groups by 28% (11), three target groups by 26% (10), four target groups by 13% (5), five 
target groups by 5% (2), and six target groups by 5% (2). Based on the survey data, a cyber range supports two 
(2.6) target groups on average. 
 
Figure 2: Number of supported target groups (N=39) 
3.2 Cyber range use cases 
A cyber range may be dedicated to a single use case, or it may support multiple use cases. The survey data 
contained 11 use cases, namely Security testing and certification, Security research & development, Competence 
Building, Security Education, Development of Cyber Capabilities, Development of Cyber Resilience, Competence 
Assessment, Recruitment, Cross-domain development environment (Digital dexterity), National and 
International Cybersecurity Competitions, and National and International Cybersecurity Exercises. The reported 
use cases were distributed (Figure 3) as Security testing and certification 44% (17), Security research & 
development 72% (28), Competence Building 62% (24), Security Education 82% (32), Development of Cyber 
Capabilities 51% (20), Development of Cyber Resilience 38% (15), Competence Assessment 36% (14), 
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Recruitment 13% (5), Cross-domain development environment (Digital dexterity) 13% (5), National and 
International Cybersecurity Competitions 26% (10), National and International Cybersecurity Exercises 44% (17).  
 
Figure 3: Distribution of use cases (N=39) 
Figure 4 displays the number of the use cases (No. of UCs) supported by the cyber ranges. All eleven use cases 
were supported by 5% (2), ten use cases by 5% (2), nine use cases by 5% (2), eight use cases by 3% (1), seven use 
cases by 10% (4), six uses cases by 10% (4), five use cases by 10% (4), four use cases by 10% (4), three use cases 
by 13% (5), two use cases by 13% (5), one use case by 15% (6) cyber ranges as reported by the respondents. On 
average, a cyber range supports four (4.79) use cases. The top 20% of cyber ranges supported eight or more use 
cases. 
 
Figure 4: Number of use cases supported by cyber ranges (N=39) 
3.3 Cyber range participant roles 
Six user roles were listed: Director (Business, Director, Communication, etc.), Developer, Researcher, Security 
professional, Educator, and Other. The survey respondents reported to option “Other” with the following: 
Sysadmin, Network admin, Student, Job Applicants, Employees, Domain specialist. Two respondents responded 
“Different roles from organisations which are responsible for some parts of cyber incident response & handling 
(e.g. Public relations, Process owners, System owners, Technical specialists)” and “CISO, Incident managers, 
depending on the roles in organisations (e.g. IT admins).”  
 
The number of participant roles is shown in Figure 6: one role 21% (8), two roles 23% (9), three roles 28% (11), 
four roles 13% (5), and five roles 13% (5). One respondent (3%) did not report the number of participant roles. 
On average, a cyber range supports two participant roles (2.66%). No cyber ranges were reported to support all 
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Figure 5: Distribution of participant roles 
 
Figure 6: Number of participant roles supported (N=39) 
3.4 Cross-tabulation of cyber range use cases and participant roles 
Table 1 shows the cross-tabulation of filtered data, where target groups were Government organizations, 
Companies and Enterprises, or Non-profit associations or similar. It shows which use cases a cyber range 
supports, and the user roles supported. The table rows represent use cases and the columns the user roles. The 
number following a use case reports the total number of times the use case was reported:  Security testing and 
certification (57), Security research & development (90), Competence Building (75), Security Education (85), 
Development of Cyber Capabilities (62), Development of Cyber Resilience (50), Competence Assessment (47), 
Recruitment (20), Cross-domain development environment (Digital dexterity) (21), National and International 
Cybersecurity Competitions (35), National and International Cybersecurity Exercises (54). In total, the user roles 
shown in the table were reported as follows: Director (Business, Director, Communication, etc.) 83 times, 
Developer 94 times, Researcher 145 times, Security professional 161 times, Educator 106 times, and Other User 
Roles seven times. In each use case the reported cyber ranges supported all the roles, except Other User Roles.  
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4. Discussion 
According to the research data, cyber ranges had various target groups (Figure 1), and the supported participant 
roles of cyber ranges were not limited to technically oriented user roles, but there were roles for e.g., directors 
(Figure 5). The cyber ranges supporting directors as a potential participant role, support a broader spectrum of 
use cases (Table 1). The data indicates that cyber ranges were used by both technical and non-technical user 
roles.  
 
When an entity, e.g., an organisation, a company or an individual faces a cyber incident, it does not require only 
technical skills to understand, resolve and respond to the incident but also non-technical skills are required 
(Fingrid, 2017). An organisation may establish a Cyber Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) that tries to 
respond to and resolve the attack. According to Onwubiko and Ouazzane (2020), CSIRTs should have the 
necessary expertise and support from the infrastructure and networking teams, systems administration and 
management teams, business continuity and disaster recovery teams, communications and press office, and 
designated senior management teams. In case of severe enough incident, senior management could provide 
decision-making and funding support; a cyber incident may require a dedicated cost-budget that only the senior 
management can allocate. The CSIRT example and exercising or training for incidents can be seen as preparing 
for a local and limited duration crisis. The work to recover from a cyber incident may last long, even several 
months, depending on the size of the organisation. In larger organisations, the CSIRT team contains these 
dedicated roles.  
 
In conclusion, the key question of this article “Are cyber ranges just for technical people or do they actually 
provide vital tools for the organisation to prepare against a crisis?”, we might say that based on our research 
results, cyber ranges enable the organisations to carry out more than just technical mitigation measures. 
However, this highly depends on the decisions made by the organisation itself on how well they take the 
different functionalities into use and make full use of the platform. Simply said, a cyber range acquired only for 
a specific technical purpose might be somewhat limited in terms of functionality. Since there are quite a few 
cyber range platforms available on the market with various features ranging from single technical point solutions 
to comprehensive cyber arenas including realistic simulation of business processes and technical systems, 
selecting the right tool for a specific organisation might require thorough examination of available options and 
possibly even external consultation.  
 
The research results show that some cyber ranges support or have participated in national or international 
cybersecurity exercises. Such exercises, when exercising joint operations of civil government and authorities, or 
security authorities, require there to be non-technical participants, so that the areas of responsibilities as stated 
by national or international laws are followed. 
 
Individuals, cyber professionals, government organisations, companies and enterprises, and degree program 
students use cyber ranges for competence building and development. The business features and domains as 
well as the technical features and functionalities they provide for users should be researched further. As the 
original survey was not specifically designed for the purpose of analysing the scope of educational cyber range 
use, there is a definite need for a new survey. The questions should be adjusted so that their scope focuses more 
on the previously studied subject and perhaps includes multiple different subjects. Future research might focus 
on the features, functionalities and properties of cyber ranges which have been reported to support non-
technical roles for a better understanding of the potential use cases that they could participate for. 
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